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 
Abstract— Industrial Ethernet is a technology widely 
spread in factory floors and critical infrastructures where 
a high amount of data need to be collected and 
transported. Fiber optic networks at gigabit rates fit well 
with that type of environments where speed, system 
performance and reliability are critical. In this work a new 
encryption method for high speed optical communications 
suitable for such kind of networks is proposed. This new 
encryption method consists of a symmetric streaming 
encryption of the 8b/10b data flow at PCS (Physical 
Coding Sublayer) level. It is carried out thanks to an FPE 
(Format Preserving Encryption) blockcipher working in 
CTR (Counter) mode. The overall system has been 
simulated and implemented in an FPGA (Field 
Programmable Gate Array). Thanks to experimental 
results it can be concluded that it is possible to cipher 
traffic at this physical level in a secure way. In addition, no 
overhead is introduced during encryption, getting 
minimum latency and maximum throughput. 
 
Index Terms— cryptography, Industrial Ethernet, optical 
communications, stream cipher. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HANKS to advances in Information Technology during 
the last decades, communication solutions at automation 
level in the ICS (Industrial Control Systems) have evolved 
from legacy field buses to Ethernet technology [1], [2], [3]. 
Ethernet has increased significantly its use as communication 
solution for SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition) networks. On the other hand, not only data from 
industrial equipment is supported in SCADA networks, but 
also data traffic from surveillance video security and future 
IoT applications. Both kind of applications demand high 
transmission bandwidth. Therefore telecommunication 
equipment adapted for industrial environments with rates up to 
1 Gbps and beyond are available from many vendors. A 
simple scheme of a SCADA network is shown in Fig. 1. 
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Among different transmission media in Ethernet standards, 
optical fiber provides the best bandwidth, less signal loses, and 
more immunity to electromagnetic interference than other 
wired systems. Owing to this advantages many research 
related with multigigabit optical transceivers has been carried 
out for applications in industrial environments [4], [5]. 
In respect to wireless systems, optical communications can 
be considered safer as they do not emit any radiation that can 
be captured by an intruder. However, the optical signal can be 
intercepted easily thanks to fiber coupling devices and electro-
optical converters [6]. Moreover it can be performed without 
perceptibly interfere in communications. 
In layered communication models like OSI (Open Systems 
Interconnection) or TCP/IP, several encryption techniques can 
be used to avoid passive eavesdropping. It depends on the 
communication layer where confidentiality is needed. Many 
solutions proposed for industrial Ethernet encryption are 
usually for layers 3 or 4 such as IPsec or TLS (Transport 
Layer Security) standards, respectively. These offer security 
when field buses are attached to IP networks by means of a 
gateway [7]. Other solutions are proposed for layer 2, such as 
MACsec standard [8]. Moreover, industrial communication 
equipment, with layer 2 and layer 3 encryption capabilities are 
nowadays available from some vendors, and they are used to 
protect ICS from both internal and external cyber-attacks. 
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Fig. 1.  Simple example of a SCADA network sharing field device traffic
and video security. 
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Regarding layer 1 encryption in optical communications, 
there is no proposal for Ethernet. However there are solutions 
related with optical technology such as OCDM (Optical Code-
Division Multiplexing) [6], or with physical layer protocols, 
such as the encryption of OTN (Optical Transport Network) 
frame payloads [9]. The latter is mainly used by service 
providers to grant security on the carrier telecommunication 
networks. 
Some advantages of performing encryption at layer 1 is that 
no extra data fields are introduced on ciphering packets, unlike 
protocols at other layers do [10]. Thanks to this, no throughput 
is wasted for transmitting this extra overhead. For example, 
OTN commercial equipment is usually able to perform 
encryption at line rate, achieving a 100% throughput and 
introducing very low latency [11], in the range of 
nanoseconds. It contrasts with other encryption methods such 
as IPsec which usually introduces latencies in the range of 
milliseconds. 
Regarding to Ethernet, 1000Base-X is one of the most 
widely used physical layer standards at 1 Gbps rate in optical 
communications, and there is no mechanism providing layer 1 
security on it. On the other hand, gigabit optical Ethernet is 
widely used in industrial Ethernet networks, where for certain 
applications a high level of determinism is needed, and there 
can be strict requirements for network delay and jitter [12]. A 
physical layer encryption mechanism could provide the 
mentioned advantages such as zero overhead and low 
latencies. This kind of ‘in-flight’ encryption could be useful 
with real time protocols, such as EtherCAT or PROFINET 
IRT [12], [13], enabling encryption to be performed at line 
rate. 
The main motivation of this work is to propose and 
implement an encryption method suitable for the PCS 
(Physical Coding Sublayer) of the 1000Base-X standard. The 
physical coding of this Ethernet layer is the well-known 
8b/10b encoding. To get ‘in-flight’ encryption of the 8b/10b 
symbol stream, a stream cipher that preserves the format of 
this codification is necessary.  
As far as the authors are concerned, there is no standardized 
or recommended format preserving stream cipher. However, 
recently several FPE (Format Preserving Encryption) modes 
of operation have been approved by NIST (National Institute 
of Standards and Technology) [14]. The structures described 
in these modes can be understood as a kind of FPE 
“blockciphers” [15] that are able to encrypt data in the desired 
format. Its use in a like-of ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode 
is proposed to provide security in databases with an arbitrary 
format [15] or in legacy ICS protocols [16]. 
In this work, CTR (counter) mode is proposed to be used 
with “FPE blockciphers” to achieve security in high 
throughput applications where data format must be preserved. 
For example the Gigabit Ethernet 1000Base-X physical layer. 
The paper is divided into the following sections. In Section 
II an introduction to PCS layer encryption necessities is given, 
in Section III an introduction to the FPE NIST 
recommendations is made. In Section IV security 
considerations of the proposed structure is given and the 
analysis of the keystream output is carried out. Subsequently, 
Section V deals with the practical case for Gigabit Ethernet 
1000Base-X layer and the overall structure of the proposed 
encryption system. In section VI, the hardware 
implementation of the cipher is described and results of the 
encryption are explained. Finally, in section VII conclusions 
are given. 
II. CODING PRESERVING ENCRYPTION 
Physical Coding Sublayer is part of the Ethernet 
1000Base-X standard and performs functions such as 
autonegotiation, link establishment, clock rate adaptation and 
data encoding. 
As other high speed standards, a baseband serial data 
transmission is carried out while clock frequency information 
is embedded in the serial bitstream itself. Thanks to bit 
transitions in the data stream the clock recovery circuits are 
able to extract the frequency information at the receiver.  
Consequently, serial data sampling is made at the 
appropriate time. In order to facilitate the work of the CDR 
(Clock and Data Recovery) circuit, information must be 
encoded in such a way that a good transition density and a 
short run length are achieved. Also a DC-balanced serial data 
stream must be guaranteed by getting a good disparity. 
Block line encoders group input bits into ݉-bit blocks and 
map these blocks into ݊-bit blocks where ݊ is greater than ݉. 
Thanks to the redundancy introduced in data, block encoders 
achieve the attributes mentioned previously [17] (transition 
Fig. 2.  Location and generic structure of a stream cipher in a physical 
layer with block line encoding. 
 
(a)                  (b)  
Fig. 3.  Scheme of blockcipher operation modes (a) CBC, and (b) CTR.
Plaintext is split in ܰ െ 1 blocks of ܤ bits {P0, P1, …, PN-1} to get ܰ െ 1
blocks for ciphertext {C0, C1, …, CN-1}. IV is the initial value for CBC
and CNT the counter for CTR mode, both are ܤ-bit wide. EK is the
underlying blockcipher and ܤ its blocksize in bits. 
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density, short run length and DC-balance). In the case of 
1000Base-X, 8b/10b encoding is used. 
Normally an additive stream cipher is implemented by 
carrying out the XOR operation between the plaintext and a 
keystream obtained from a secure pseudorandom generator. In 
case of encrypting physical layer when block-line encoding is 
used, it is necessary to preserve the mentioned encoder 
properties, therefore the location of the encryptor in the 
datapath must be taken into account. In the case of a block line 
code such as 8b/10b, encryption should be carried out before 
the encoder and the XOR operation would not be suitable. An 
݉-bit symbol should be encrypted giving rise to another ݉-bit 
symbol, within the alphabet of symbols supported by the 
encoding standard. If ܴ is the number of possible symbols, 
then the operation performed by the stream cipher should be a 
modulo-ܴ addition instead of an XOR. Moreover ݉-bit 
symbols should be mapped in a value between 0 and ܴ‐1 
before this addition and the resulting value reverse-mapped to 
the corresponding new ݉-bit symbols that are finally encoded. 
In Fig. 2 the generic mechanism is shown with such kind of 
encoding. The ݉-bit symbols are mapped to ܾ-bit values that 
are encrypted, reverse-mapped and finally encoded into ݊-bit 
words. In addition to these operations, the keystream generator 
must be able to produce a uniformly distributed keystream in 
the range of the available alphabet of symbols. To achieve 
this, in this work CTR mode is proposed to be used with FPE 
blockciphers. FPE modes are introduced in Section III, and 
security considerations of the overall structure are given in 
Section IV. 
III. FPE CIPHER MODES 
Format Preserving Encryption encrypts plaintext in a 
ciphertext preserving its original format and length. Some 
examples where this type of encryption is useful are the 
Primary Account Numbers (PANs) or Social Security 
Numbers (SSNs) for which standard block ciphers or their 
operating modes would not preserve the format. Currently two 
operation modes for FPE are recommended by NIST, FF1 and 
FF3 [14]. Both “ciphers” (actually they are considered 
operation modes) have a scheme based on a non-binary Feistel 
structure. In NIST recommendations the underlying round 
function of the Feistel network consists of an AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard) blockcipher, although in its original 
specifications this PRF (Pseudo Random Function) can be also 
implemented by a hash function based on HMAC (Hash-based 
Message Authentication Code) [18]. 
The main differences between both modes, FF1 and FF3, 
are the number of rounds in the Feistel structure (with a 
smaller number in FF3); and the way to achieve the arbitrary 
length message encryption. In the case of FF1, its specification 
allows message lengths up to 232 words, while in FF3 message 
length is more limited and it is constrained by the input data 
radix. However, in the original proposal for FF3, also called 
BPS (Brier Peyrin Stern), the basic blockcipher component 
BPS-BC is proposed to be used in CBC (Cipher Block 
Chaining) mode for encryption of arbitrary length messages 
[14]. In spite of this, CBC operation mode properties result in 
frequent misuse among classical confidentiality block cipher 
modes. Indeed, CTR can be considered the best and most 
modern way to achieve privacy-only encryption [19]. The 
basic operation for both modes is shown in Fig. 3. 
As far as the authors know there is no stream cipher 
proposal able to preserve the format of the plaintext symbols. 
The main stream cipher proposals are oriented to generate 
binary keystreams, as the finalists of eSTREAM project [20] 
or the well-known solution formed by secure blockciphers in 
CTR mode. Due to this absence, we consider that the use of 
the recent FPE modes approved by NIST in conjunction with 
CTR mode could be a good solution. 
IV. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. FPE with CTR Mode 
Assuming that the plaintext is a stream of symbols defined 
with radix ܴ, we can define the CTR mode for our purpose as 
described by NIST [21] but using a modulo-ܴ addition as 
encryption operation instead of an XOR. For a family of 
functions ܨ such that: 
 ܨ:ܭ	 ൈ	ሼ0, 1, … , ܴ െ 1ሽ஻ → 	 ሼ0, 1, … , ܴ െ 1ሽ஻ where ܤ is 
the block size and ܭ the keyspace, and given a plaintext  ܲ ൌ
ሼ ଴ܲ, ଵܲ, … , ௟ܲିଵሽ with ݈ ൐ ܤ, ܲ is divided into ܰ blocks ௜ܲ: 
ܰ‐1 blocks with ܤ symbols plus one block with the rest. The 
ܰ blocks of the ciphertext ܥ௜ are obtained applying Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1. CTR mode for FPE encryption 
ܥܰ ଴ܶ ൌ ܫܰܫܶ_ܥܰܶ 
ܭ௜ ൌ ܨ௄ሾܥܰ ௜ܶሿ	݂݋ݎ	݅ ൌ 0,1, … , ܰ െ 1 
ܥܰ ௜ܶାଵ ൌ ܥܰ ௜ܶ ൅ 1	݂݋ݎ	݅ ൌ 0,1,… ,ܰ െ 1 
ܥ௜ ൌ ሺ ௜ܲ ൅ ܭ௜ሻ݉݋݀	ܴ	݂݋ݎ	݅ ൌ 0,1,… ,ܰ െ 2 
ܥேିଵ ൌ ሺ ேܲିଵ ൅ܯܵܤሺܭேିଵሻሻ݉݋݀	ܴ 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Scheme of CTR mode using a FPE blockcipher FK. Plaintext is
split in ܰ െ 1 blocks of ܤ symbols with radix ܴ {P0, P1, …, PN-1} to get
ܰ െ 1 blocks for ciphertext {C0, C1, …, CN-1}. Counter values {CNT0,
CNT1, …, CNTN-1} and keystream values {K0, K1, …, KN-1} are also
blocks of ܤ symbols with radix ܴ. Modulo-ܴ addition is done symbol by
symbol inside each block between keystrem and plaintext. 
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where ܰ	ܭ௜ blocks are the keystream obtained from ܰ 
successively counter values ܥܰ ௜ܶ. ܯܵܤሺܭேିଵሻ are the Most Significant Symbols of the last keystream block that operate 
with the remaining symbols in the last plaintext block ேܲିଵ. 
The modulo-ܴ addition is performed symbol by symbol 
between each plaintext and keystream blocks. In Fig. 4 the 
proposed scheme is shown. 
The decryption algorithm will be as Algorithm 1, but 
replacing the plaintext ܲ with the ciphertext ܥ, and the 
modulo-ܴ addition by a modulo-ܴ subtraction.  
According to [22] and posterior studies it can be shown that 
in the sense of IND-CPA (indistinguishability against chosen-
plaintext attacks) security, given an adversary ܺ attacking a 
CTR scheme there exists another adversary ܻ attacking the 
PRF security of the underlying function ܨ௄ of that CTR 
scheme. The advantages, ܣܦܸ, of such adversaries are related 
as shown in (1). 
 
ܣܦ ஼்ܸோூே஽ି஼௉஺ሺܺሻ ൑ 2 ∙ ܣܦ ிܸ௉ோிሺܻሻ															ሺ1ሻ  
Also according to its proof, it can be concluded that it holds 
independently of the radix ܴ on which the CTR mode 
operates. On the other hand, according to the PRF-PRP 
switching lemma [22] and since the underlying function ܨ௄	 is a blockcipher that can be considered a PRP, it is well-known 
that the cited advantage is degraded by a term of ܳଶ/2஻ାଵ, as 
shown in (2). 
 
ܣܦ ஼்ܸோூே஽ି஼௉஺ሺܺሻ ൑ 2 ∙ ሺܣܦ ிܸ௉ோ௉ሺܻሻ ൅ ܳଶ/2஻ାଵሻ								ሺ2ሻ  
where ܳ is the number of queries made by the adversary ܻ and 
ܤ the blocksize of the blockcipher. In the case of an FPE 
blockcipher with radix ܴ this factor will be ܳଶ/2ܴ஻. Indeed, 
due to the birthday paradox, it could be considered insecure to 
encrypt more than ܳ ൌ √ܴ஻ blocks with the same key. 
 It is possible to conclude that, in the same way that the use 
of CTR mode with a standard blockcipher is considered safe, 
we can safely use the CTR mode with an FPE blockcipher. On 
the other hand, it will be important to take into account that 
the block size ܤ is a configurable parameter for FPE 
blockciphers, and it affects the overall security of the CTR 
scheme. 
One requisite for ܤ could be provide the same security limit 
as a recommended blockcipher with a 128-bit blocksize. For 
AES working in CTR mode ܳ ൌ 2଺ସ, then the data limit to be 
transmitted before key refreshing should be lower than ܮ ൌ ܳ ∙
128 ൌ 2଻ଵ bits. As the proposed system in this work should 
have at least the same bound we have taken as design 
constraint the requisite shown in (3). 
 
ܮ ൌ ܳ ∙ ܤ ∙ ܾ ൒ 	2଻ଵ → ඥܴ஻ ∙ ܤ ൒ 2
଻ଵ
ܾ 															ሺ3ሻ  
where ܤ is the blocksize in symbols defined with radix ܴ, and 
ܾ the information bits represented by each symbol in the 
encoding standard. This constraint gives a lower bound for ܤ 
and it is taken into account in Section V where the cipher 
parameters are explained. 
B. Keystream Analysis 
It is well known that one of the security criteria of a stream 
cipher is based on the fact that the generated keystream is 
indistinguishable from a truly random sequence. Therefore it 
is useful to check the randomness of the obtained keystream 
sequence ሼܭ଴, ܭଵ, … , ܭேିଵሽ in Fig. 4. 
Among the most used tests for randomness, we can 
highlight some of them such as NIST [23], Diehard [24] or 
TestU01 [25]. All of them need as input a binary stream or a 
sequence of integers within a range that is a power of two. In 
our case the keystream values are not included in a range like 
that due to the encoding used. The range of possible values for 
the keystream will be explained later in Section V and VI. As 
far as the authors know, there is no standardized set of tests 
able to check the randomness of a sequence of integer 
numbers that are not included in a power of two range. 
However, the battery of tests proposed by Knuth [26] does 
include different tests that are suitable for our purpose, as they 
do not have the mentioned constraint. 
In this work the keystream resulting from our FPE 
implementation was evaluated applying the following tests 
described in [26]: frequency test, serial test for pairs and 
triples of symbols, poker test, run and serial correlation test. 
Regarding to frequency and serial test, Chi-Square 
Goodness of Fit test was applied successfully with 5% and 1% 
of significance level. Histograms for the keystream sequence 
organized in tuples of one and two symbols are shown in Fig. 
5a and Fig. 5b for sequences of 3 and 15 millions of tuples, 
respectively. 
As for Poker test, also Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test was 
applied using the five categories described by Knuth [26]. 
With respect to run test, it was applied to runs up and down 
successfully for sequences of 5000 values. 
Correlation coefficient was calculated for a window of 
25000 samples and shifts up to 100000, giving a result 
(a)            (b)   
Fig. 5.  Histograms obtained in: (a) frequency test and (b) serial test. 
Sequence values units in (b) are given in thousands. 
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between the bounds recommended for this test. 
Although the fulfillment of a statistical test does not 
guarantees that the sequence is truly random, we can conclude 
that the generated sequence is suitable as keystream for the 
proposed stream cipher. 
V. APPLICATION CASE: ETHERNET 1000BASE-X 
In this paper we have focused on the case of high-speed 
communications, particularly in the 1000Base-X standard used 
in optical Gigabit Ethernet links. In this standard, the PCS 
(Physical Coding Sublayer) level is responsible for generating 
and encoding control and data symbols that are transmitted to 
the optical line. As the block line coding is 8b/10b the purpose 
of the encryption will be to cipher the complete 8b/10b 
symbol flow as shown in Fig. 2. 
The main advantage of the proposed method is that there is 
no throughput loss because no extra data fields are added to 
the packets when are encrypted, then no overhead is 
introduced. Moreover it not only encrypts the contents of the 
packets but also the activity or data traffic pattern. This is 
because by encrypting at 8b/10b symbol level, control 
symbols and ordered sets are also encrypted, such as packet 
start and end symbols or IDLE sets in the IFG (Inter Frame 
Gap). This last capacity could improve security as it prevents 
passive eavesdroppers from performing traffic analysis 
attacks. It would be useful in scenarios where traffic pattern 
analysis could reveal sensitive information about the behavior 
of a critical infrastructure or facility.  
The data set to be encrypted is a limited set, since the valid 
8b/10b symbols are composed of 256 data symbols plus 12 
control symbols, a total of 268 symbols which do not generate 
code errors. On the other hand, the special control symbol 
/K28.7/ used only in diagnostic functions is capable of 
generating an undesired Ethernet “comma” sequence if it 
coincides sequentially with some particular symbols [27]. A 
comma across any two adjacent code-groups may cause code-
group realignment. Symbol /K28.7/ is not used for standard 
data communication, and in order to avoid the accidental 
generation of it in the encryption of any 8b/10b symbol it has 
been excluded from the encryption symbol mapping. 
Therefore, the valid set of symbols consist of 267 possible 
values to be encrypted. As in Fig. 2, in order to carry out the 
encryption, the 267 possible symbols are mapped in the range 
of 0 to 266, giving a value of 267 for radix parameter ܴ. After 
symbol mapping, modulo-ܴ addition is performed with the 
keystream. Once the cipher operation is done, the resulting 
values are reverse-mapped to the corresponding new 8b/10b 
symbol. The new symbols will generate neither code error nor 
realignment as they exist in the set of 267 possible symbols 
and /K28.7/ has been excluded from it. 
To generate the keystream, an FPE blockcipher in CTR 
mode has been built. Among the two NIST recommendations, 
FF1 and FF3, we have selected the latter. FF1 mode is not as 
limited in block length as FF3, since its specification says that 
it can reach up to 232 symbols, then a greater security could be 
achieved. However, since for FF3 mode fewer rounds are 
required in the Feistel network, the cost in hardware resources 
is lower. In this mode the block size is limited according to the 
radix used, as shown in (4). 
 
ܴ	 ⋲ ሾ2…2ଵ଺ሿ 
ܴ௠௜௡௟௘௡ ൒ 100																																		ሺ4ሻ 
2 ൑ ݈݉݅݊݁݊	 ൑ ݉ܽݔ݈݁݊ ൑ 2⎿݈݋݃ோሺ2ଽ଺ሻ⏌  
where ܴ is the radix and ݈݉݅݊݁݊ and ݉ܽݔ݈݁݊ the bounds for 
the block size ܤ. Since radix is 267, according to this equation 
block size ܤ is between 2 and 22.  
On the other hand, according to (1), for ܴ ൌ 267 and ܾ ൌ 8 
information bits/symbol, ܤ should be greater than or equal to 
16, therefore it is possible to achieve this value using FF3 
mode, as 22 is the maximum allowable value for ܤ. 
In this work the selected value for block size is the 
maximum, it means 22. The maximum block size means a 
greater number of cycles available per stage of a possible 
pipelined architecture, which allows a better reuse of the 
resources consumed by the hardware. 
Given these parameters, the structure of the full streaming 
encryption system is shown in Fig. 6. It is similar to Fig. 2, but 
the keystream generator module has been replaced with the 
final CTR structure based on FPE blockcipher. 
 In Fig. 6. TX_PCS_CTRL module represents the PCS 
(Physical Coding Sublayer) controller that generates the 
8b/10b symbol flow. Each symbol is formed by its 8-bit value 
ܦ_݅݊, and the control flag ܭ_݅݊. This control flag signals if the 
8b/10b symbol is a control or data one, depending if its value 
is ‘1’ or ‘0’, respectively. Both signals, ܦ_݅݊ and ܭ_݅݊ are the 
input to the cipher. The encrypted output is a new 8b/10b 
symbol formed by ܦ_݋ݑݐ and ܭ_݋ݑݐ, and it is the input of the 
encoder. 
Fig. 6.  Overall structure for the streaming encryption system in a
physical layer with 8b/10b encoding. Decryption will be as encryption
but using a modulo-267 subtraction instead of an addition. 
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In this structure, for each clock cycle a modulo-22 counter 
(called ‘cnt_mod_22’ in Fig. 6) selects one of the 22 symbols 
from the output block of the FPE blockcipher. In Fig. 6 these 
symbols are represented by the set ሼܵ଴, ଵܵ, … , ܵଶଵሽ. The 
selected output symbol will be added to the incoming plaintext 
thanks to the modulo-267 addition. The FPE output block is 
refreshed every 22 cycles. The same happens with its input 
block that comes from CTR counter (called COUNTER in 
Fig. 6). This COUNTER also will increment its value every 22 
cycles. 
VI. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
A. System Description 
FF3 encryption algorithm is described in [14] and it 
implements a non-binary Feistel network. In this work, the 
cipher tweak value has been set to zero, and only the key is 
configurable. By taking into account the parameters that we 
need for our system (radix ܴ ൌ 267 and block size ܤ ൌ 22) 
the hardware structure for the FPE blockcipher can be 
particularized and represented as shown in Fig. 7, where the 
main functions are implemented in modules REV, NUM, 
STR, AES and  ݉݋݀	267ଵଵ, all of them described in [14]. In 
this implementation AES module has a key size of 128 bits. 
The width of the data bus in each branch of the Feistel 
network is 11 symbols, half of the block size. 
This design has a pipelined architecture to achieve the 
required throughput, as blocksize is 22, every 22 cycles 22 
symbols are generated in the blockcipher output and each 
stage in the pipeline can last at most 22 cycles. Each round can 
be implemented in several stages and its number depends on 
the functions that it carries out. Particularly, in this 
implementation, function REV takes zero stages, NUM and 
AES one stage, STR 10 stages, and  ݉݋݀	267ଵଵ two stages. 
B. Implementation Results 
The system described in Fig. 7 has been implemented in a 
Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA. Regarding the resources used for the 
FPE blockcipher, these are shown in Table I in terms of LUTs 
(Look-Up Tables), registers, and Block RAMs. In this design, 
no DSP (Digital Signal Processing) cell has been used. 
Table I also shows a resource comparison with other 
implementations, particularly with [16], where FF1 and FF3 
modes are implemented. Such implementations use an 
iterative looping architecture that saves resources but 
increments the number of cycles to carry out one block 
encryption. Although it is difficult to establish a comparison, it 
has been made in terms of throughput/resources. Among the 
three modes studied in [16], only FF1 and FF3 mode have 
been selected for the comparison, as FF2 was removed from 
NIST recommendation. 
As shown in Table I the proposed system in this work entails 
a ratio throughput/resources better than existing FPE 
implementations. This comparison is only orientative as 
FPGA devices used in both implementations are different. 
While in [16] implementation is made over a Virtex-6 device, 
in this work Virtex-7 is used. Anyway, in both devices CLB 
 
Fig. 7. Hardware structure of the implemented FPE blockcipher of Fig. 6. Its input is the stream of counter values and its output the keystream. 
TABLE I: COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOLUTIONS 
 FF1 [16]  FF3 [16] This Work 
Slice Registers 11285 5592 11127 
Slice LUTs 7426 3587 16978 
18K Block RAMs1 343 170 77 
Slices2 3268 1596 5636 
Operation. Freq. 
(MHz) 279.6 283.5 125 
Cycles/Encryption 707 269 1 
Bytes/Encryption 13 13 1 
Encryption Rate 
(Mbps) 41.1 109.6 1000  
Encryption Rate/Slice 
(Kbps/Slice) 12.57 68.7 177.4 
177 Block RAMs are used in this work is due to the AES core.2Slices are 
estimated from the number of register and LUTs, assuming they are not 
packed together.  
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structure is similar in terms of LUTs and registers, with four 
6-input LUTs and 8 registers per slice. 
Also, it is important to remark that in this work the 
necessary radix is 267. It implies that ݉݋݀	267ଵଵ and STR 
modules are more complex to implement than the cases where 
radix is a power of two. In the latter division and modulo 
operations could simply be reduced to shifting and slicing 
operations over bit vectors.  
C. Encryption Set-Up 
To test the proposed encryption system, the overall system 
described in Fig. 6 has been integrated in a 1000Base-X 
Ethernet interface linked to an Ethernet frame generator. Two   
chains composed each one by an Ethernet interface and 
Ethernet frame generator have been implemented over a 
Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA. In the set-up for test the Ethernet 
interfaces have been connected to two SFP (Small Form-
Factor Pluggable) modules suitable for Gigabit Ethernet 
standard over multimode fiber. The overall set-up scheme and 
a photo of the hardware system are shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, 
respectively. In Fig. 10 the structure of the Ethernet interface 
is shown.  Ethernet frame generators have been used to check 
the encrypted link with real traffic and verify that no frames 
are lost and no CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) errors are 
produced during encryption. 
The final PCS structure, shown in Fig. 10 contains the 
encryption and decryption modules. In the 8b/10b TX datapath 
the latency introduced by the encryption module 
TX_ENCRYPT is 192 ns, and approximately the same for the 
RX datapath. In addition, no overhead is introduced in the 
encryption process, then a 100% throughput is achieved.  
These values of latency and throughput are a doubtless 
improvement with respect to other encryption mechanisms, 
such as IPsec. As an example, in [28] latency measurements 
made over commercial equipment that implements IPsec give 
values between 50 and 350 ms. Moreover the inherent 
overhead introduced by IPsec during encryption limits the 
throughput of these equipment to values between 20% and 
90% of the maximum achievable. 
D. Encryption Results 
Different Ethernet traffic patterns have been tested. 
Particularly, no frame transmission and transmission of frames 
with randomized payload at different rates have been 
encrypted. Patterns have been named A, B, C and D. A 
corresponds with the case of no frame transmission, where 
only IDLES are transmitted over the link. B, C and D  
correspond to continuous frame transmission of 1024-bytes 
 
Fig. 8.  Test set-up scheme. 
Fig. 9.  Test set-up photo with SFP modules working at 1 Gbps. 
 
Fig. 10.  Structure of the Ethernet Interface. It is composed by the MAC
module, the PCS and the SERDES. In the PCS layer TX_ENCRYPT
and RX_DECRYPT are the encryption/decryption modules. Both
include the CIPHER_OPERATION and KEYSTREAM_GENERATOR
modules shown in Fig. 6. TX_PCS_CTRL and RX_PCS_CTRL are the
PCS controllers in charge of generating and receiving the 8b/10b
symbols. 
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length at rates of 10.2%, 50% and 91% of the maximum 
Gigabit line rate, respectively.  
As mentioned previously, the proposed encryption system is 
able to make indistinguishable data traffic patterns. For this 
capability is interesting to monitor the signal waveform at the 
input of the 8b/10b encoder. As shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 10, 
the output of the encryption is the input of the encoder, and it 
is formed by the 8b/10b symbol value ܦ_݋ݑݐ and its K control 
flag (named ܭ_݋ݑݐ). Each 8b/10b symbol is a control or data 
one depending wheter its K flag is ‘1’ or ‘0’, respectively. 
ܦ_݋ݑݐ and ܭ_݋ݑݐ are used by the 8b/10b encoder to encode 
an 8-bit symbol into a 10-bit one. 
K control flag pattern has been monitored for each of the 
mentioned traffic patterns (from A to D) with the encryption 
activated and deactivated. 
When the encryption is not enabled in the case of A pattern, 
where no frames are transmitted, K control flag waveform is a 
signal that switches continuously between ‘0’ and ‘1’, as  
shown in Fig. 11a. It is because when no frame is transmitted, 
the physical layer controller (TX_PCS_CTRL module in Fig. 
10) transmits continuously IDLE sets to the 8b/10b encoder. 
These IDLE sets are composed by two consecutive symbols, 
the control symbol /K28.5/ (with K flag equals to ‘1’) plus a 
data symbol (with K flag equals to ‘0’). 
However, with encryption disabled for patterns B, C and D,  
K flag waveform seems a blast signal, as IDLE transmission 
only occurs in the IFG between frames, and during frame 
transmission only 8b/10b data symbols are transmitted (setting 
K flag continuously to ‘0’). It is shown in Fig. 11b. 
On enabling encryption, K flag waveform is completely 
randomized in all cases, A, B, C and D, making    
indistinguishable which pattern is being transmitted, as shown 
in Fig. 11c. 
As an overall result of encryption, SE (Shannon Entropy) 
has been measured for each of the mentioned patterns before 
and after encryption, as defined in (5). 
 
ܵܧ ൌ െ1݊ ∙ ෍ ܲሺߚ௡ሻ ∙ logଶ ܲሺߚ௡ሻఉ೙ఢோ೙
								ሺ5ሻ 
 
The 8b/10b symbol stream for each traffic pattern, mapped 
between 0 and ܴ-1, has been grouped in tuples of ݊ symbols, 
called ߚ௡, and the probability for each tuple, ܲሺߚ௡ሻ, has been 
calculated. Particularly, SE has been measured for values of ݊ 
from 1 to 3 in each of the mentioned patterns A, B, C and D. 
For each ݊, 1, 2 and 3, the length of the used sequences has 
been 2.67, 14.26 and 571 Msamples, respectively. 
 Because in (5) logarithms with base 2 are used, SE result is 
given in bits/symbol. Ideally, if every ݊-tuple (ߚ௡) is equally 
likely with probability  ܲሺߚ௡ሻ ൌ ݌ ൌ ܴି୬ the value of 
Shannon Entropy for every ݊ should be as in (6). 
 
െ1݊ ∙ ܴ
௡ ∙ ݌ ∙ logଶ ݌ ൌ logଶ ܴ ൌ logଶ 267 ≅ 8.0606					ሺ6ሻ 
 
Owing to the limited memory in FPGA hardware resources, 
measurements for each pattern have been calculated at 
simulation stage, but this fact does not invalidate experimental 
results. 
In Fig. 12, values of SE with ݊ from 1 to 3 and for patterns 
A, B, C and D are shown. These values are compared with a 
fifth case named E, which corresponds to the randomized 
signal after encryption of pattern A, which can be considered 
the worst case in terms of entropy. In this last pattern E, it is 
possible to notice that SE is, as expected, almost the ideal 
value 8.0606. However as the transmission rate decreases 
from D to A, SE value also decrease. It is a logical result, as 
when lower bandwidth transmission is used, IFGs full of 
IDLES takes more bandwidth percentage versus the random 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
Fig. 11. (a) K flag pattern without encryption when no Ethernet frame is
transmitted; (b) K flag pattern without encryption when transmitting an
Ethernet frame burst; (c) K flag pattern after encryption regardless of
the transmission or non-transmission of Ethernet frames. 
 
Fig. 12. Shannon Entropy measured with n from 1 to 3, and for all
mentioned Ethernet traffic patterns, A, B, C, D and E. 
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payloads of the transmitted frames. 
Thank to this results, it is possible to conclude that 
encryption works and makes indistinguishable data traffic 
patterns, which permits to hide the pattern and contents of 
Ethernet traffic from any passive eavesdropper. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As far as the authors are aware, this is the first time that an 
encryption mechanism is proposed for ciphering physical layer 
communications based in 8b/10b coding. This new encryption 
system consists of symmetric ciphering of the complete 
8b/10b symbol stream. Encryption based on an FPE 
blockcipher working in CTR mode has been simulated and 
implemented. Also security considerations have been taken 
into account. The proposed system is able to obfuscate the 
data traffic pattern, which could improve the overall security, 
with no throughput losses, null overhead and low latency. 
These properties make this kind of ‘in-flight’ encryption 
suitable for protocols where delay and jitter are critical, such 
as real time Ethernet in industrial environments, which would 
improve security in modern optical SCADA networks. 
In addition to this, by preserving coding properties as 
DC-balance, short run length, and transition density, physical 
layer encryption is achieved easily without making changes in 
the subsequent hardware elements or medium dependent 
circuitry. As an example, in Ethernet 1000Base-X standard, 
SERDES (Serializer/Deserializer) and commercial SFP (Small 
Form-Factor Pluggable) optical modules could be compatible 
with the proposed encryption system. 
Regarding to its implementation, although in the proposed 
system there is an increment in the hardware resources with 
respect a standard AES blockcipher, this system entails a ratio 
throughput/resources better than existing FPE 
implementations. 
Finally, as future work, authors consider to study the 
implementation of physical layer encryption for other Ethernet 
standards with higher transmission rates such as 10G-BaseR. 
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